The FIFA Council met on 15 October as we flagged, withdrew Forward Enterprise permanently and proposed distributing $6.35bn instead — nearly triple what its members had demanded, spread across four years. Saudi Arabia's sovereign fund is clearing debt at Al-Nassr ahead of a sale that would follow Al Hilal's. Serie A is weighing two bids that differ more in structure than in price, and the regulator's draft assessment has put the first measurement on how far English clubs depend on their owners.
TL;DR
FIFA withdrew Forward Enterprise on 15 October and proposed a $6.35bn Surplus Solidarity Programme for 2027–2030, against the $2.326bn one-off distribution UEFA and CONCACAF had demanded.
FIFA proposes retaining $1.7bn in hard reserves — below the $2.3bn retention its critics had recommended.
PIF is arranging sponsorship agreements to address roughly SAR800m ($213m) of Al-Nassr debt, with a RedBird-led consortium in preliminary talks over 70% at around SAR1bn ($267m).
On our own published Al Hilal figures, Al-Nassr's implied equity valuation of SAR1.43bn sits 19% above Al Hilal's SAR1.2bn — but would transfer a business carrying materially less debt.
Avenue Capital's €320m for 10% of Serie A's international rights implies €3.2bn, below a rival bid at roughly €3.75bn that seeks protections over future cash flows Avenue does not.
The IFR's draft State of the Game report found 94% of clubs loss-making in a game generating around £9bn; consultation closes 8 December and the final report is due in 2027.
Private-credit lenders are extending facilities sized against estimated squad values, secured on proceeds from future player sales.
Bordeaux's 20 October hearing did not conclude: creditors vote from 26 October and the tribunal rules on 3 November.
FIFA: The Council Answers, at Three Times the Price
Our 12 October briefing identified the FIFA Council meeting of 15 October as the decision point in the reserves dispute. It resolved both questions in front of it, and not in the direction the demands pointed.
Gianni Infantino apologised for the handling and communication of the FIFA Forward Enterprise proposal and confirmed it has been permanently withdrawn and will not reappear in any form. Externally appointed lawyers briefed Council members on confidential legal proceedings in the United States, and a working group drawn from across the confederations will now examine FIFA's governance framework.
In its place FIFA proposed the Surplus Solidarity Programme, directing $6.35bn to football development across 2027–2030 and providing up to $25m to each of the 211 member associations. The programme would draw partly on accumulated reserves, following an unaudited surplus forecast of $5.2bn to $5.6bn for the 2023–2026 cycle, with FIFA proposing to maintain $1.7bn in hard reserves.
Set against the demands that preceded it, the answer is larger than the question. UEFA and CONCACAF had sought a one-off $10m to each of the 211 associations, $36m to each of the six confederations and $3m per eligible regional union, aggregating above $2.326bn. FIFA has instead offered $25m per association across a four-year cycle. The headline sum is nearly three times the demand, but the structure converts an immediate distribution into a programme — and a programme can be revised at the Council in December or at Congress in March 2027 in a way that a completed payment cannot.
The reserves position has also inverted. The October correspondence recommended FIFA retain approximately $2.3bn, equivalent to a year of projected recurring expenditure. FIFA now proposes retaining $1.7bn, below what its critics said it should hold. Whether the two figures are measured on the same basis has not been established, and FIFA has published no reconciliation between accumulated reserves, the current cycle's surplus and planned 2027–2030 expenditure.
The institution has moved, within a single meeting and under sustained pressure from its own members, from proposing to raise external capital against its commercial activities to proposing to distribute resources it already holds. That is a reversal of direction, not a modification of terms. The programme remains a proposal.
Al-Nassr: The Second Divestment
Our 7 October briefing read the August transfer of the sports foundations' residual 25% stakes to PIF, and the dissolution of those boards, as a standard step ahead of sale. Al-Nassr is the first evidence of what that sequence produces.
Semafor reported on 19 October that PIF is arranging corporate sponsorship agreements involving its portfolio companies to address approximately SAR800m, or $213m, of debt held by Al-Nassr, with the objective of strengthening the balance sheet ahead of a sale. The reported counterparty is a consortium led by RedBird Capital Partners, owner of AC Milan and Toulouse and a minority holder in Fenway Sports Group, which has held at least two meetings with PIF over a 70% stake valued at around SAR1bn, or $267m. Cristiano Ronaldo is reported as expected to hold 20%, though whether that sits within the consortium's 70% or alongside it has not been established, and the percentages should not be added. RedBird and PIF declined to comment; Al-Nassr and Ronaldo's representatives did not respond. Semafor cautioned the discussions are early and may not produce a transaction.
The comparison with Al Hilal is exact, because we published the terms. Kingdom Holding completed its acquisition of 70% from PIF on 1 September under a share sale and purchase agreement signed on 16 April, paying SAR840m in full, implying an equity valuation of SAR1.2bn with an enterprise value of roughly SAR1.4bn once debt was counted. PIF retained 30%.
Al-Nassr at SAR1bn for 70% implies equity of approximately SAR1.43bn, about 19% above Al Hilal's. But the structures differ in a way the headline obscures. Al Hilal transferred carrying roughly SAR200m of debt inside its enterprise value. Al-Nassr's debt is being addressed before sale, so a completed transaction on the reported terms would hand the buyer a business with materially less leverage at a higher equity price. Those are different propositions, and the premium narrows once that is taken into account.
The mechanics of the debt treatment warrant precision, because four steps are involved and only the first is reported. Arranging sponsorship agreements is not recognising commercial revenue, which is not receiving cash, which is not settling a liability. Sponsorship income may allow debt to be repaid over time; signing the agreements does not extinguish it. What an acquirer buys therefore depends on where in that sequence the transaction completes, and on whether the related-party sponsorship continues under private ownership — a club with cleared debt and continuing state-linked commercial income is a different asset from one with cleared debt and none.
This does not establish a withdrawal of state support. PIF remains a 30% shareholder in Al Hilal, and the Al-Nassr structure under discussion would retain sponsorship income from state-controlled portfolio companies. What is changing is the form of the support, not necessarily its existence.
Serie A: The Rights Matter More Than the Valuation
Reuters reported on 16 October that Avenue Capital had emerged as frontrunner for a minority interest in Serie A's international commercial-rights business, offering approximately €320m for 10% — implying €3.2bn for a venture that would hold international broadcasting, sponsorship and betting rights.
A rival proposal from Carlyle and Nextalia offered approximately €650m for roughly 17%, which Reuters described as implying about €3.75bn. Dividing the stated figures gives €3.824bn, but both inputs are approximate and the calculated number should not be treated as more precise than the reported bid.
The higher headline has not made it the preferred offer. Avenue's bid is structured as common equity, while competing proposals seek protections over future cash flows. The specific contractual protections have not been disclosed and should not be assumed.
The principle holds regardless. The economic value of a bid depends on the rights attached to it, not the implied valuation alone. Protections over future cash flows transfer risk as well as return: where an investor holds a prior claim on distributions, underperformance in international revenues is absorbed first by the clubs. Members comparing €3.75bn against €3.2bn are not comparing like with like, and the gap between the risk positions may exceed the gap between the numbers.
Serie A's international media business generates approximately €250m a year, substantially below the Premier League and LaLiga. That is context rather than a measure of the venture's revenue, since the rights being transferred have not been fully specified. Any agreement requires approval from at least 14 of the 20 clubs, and none has been reached.
Private Credit: Borrowing Against a Valuation Model
The Financial Times reported on 15 October that private-credit lenders are providing financing sized against estimated squad values, taking security over proceeds from future player sales. These are reported structures rather than products under consideration.
Financing type
Underlying exposure
Principal risk
Contracted transfer receivable
Amount owed under a completed transfer
Counterparty credit and payment risk
Squad-value facility
Debt sized against estimated player values
Valuation, liquidity, refinancing and repayment risk
Equity investment
Ownership interest in the club
Residual business and valuation risk
Future-rights monetisation
Economic participation in commercial revenue
Revenue performance and contractual priority
One distinction is frequently blurred and worth stating plainly. A lender may hold priority over proceeds from player sales without holding any power to compel a sale. Security and enforcement rights are not control over sporting decisions.
Nor is a facility problematic merely because the borrower is loss-making. The relevant questions are debt-service capacity, the security package, maturity, covenants, the repayment waterfall and downside protection — as for any leveraged borrower.
The central risk is narrower. Borrowing capacity becomes linked to a valuation model while repayment remains a fixed obligation. A player who suffers a serious injury, approaches the end of his contract or attracts fewer buyers may realise substantially less than the value used to size the facility. Unless the terms absorb that shortfall, the club carries the difference — and may be forced into the sale the facility was intended to avoid, at a worse moment.
England: What the Regulator Measured, and What It Means for Credit
The Independent Football Regulator published its draft State of the Game report on 13 October, running to 245 pages and open for consultation until 8 December, with a final report expected in 2027. It found that 94% of clubs across England's top five divisions are loss-making in a game generating around £9bn a year, that more than a quarter could not survive thirty days without further owner funding, and that seventeen EFL and National League clubs had non-player operating costs exceeding revenue — meaning they would remain loss-making with no player wages at all. In 1992/93 the average Premier League club's revenue was 2.7 times the average Championship club's; by 2024/25 it was 8.7 times.
Our sister publication The Pyramid has examined the report's club-level consequences in detail, including owner dependence and the compliance behaviour the findings have produced. Readers wanting that analysis should start there. The institutional question is different, and it bears directly on the capital structures described above.
An accounting loss does not establish that operating cash flow is negative, that a club cannot service debt, or that no repayment source exists. Non-cash amortisation of transfer fees, player-trading proceeds, working-capital movements and shareholder funding all separate reported profit from cash generation. The 94% figure describes accounting performance; the thirty-day finding describes liquidity dependence. For a lender the second matters more than the first, and the two should not be merged.
What the draft establishes for credit purposes is that historical accounting performance and owner-funded liquidity are central to assessment. Neither a lender nor an investor can rely on sporting assets, league membership or headline revenues without examining the availability, durability and contractual priority of the cash flows behind them. That applies with particular force to squad-value facilities, where the repayment source is a future realisation rather than recurring income, in a population where recurring operating profit is the exception.
On the domestic settlement, the two leagues remain apart, and the reported terms contain a result that cuts against how the dispute has been described. The Pyramid's per-club analysis of 19 October finds that the EFL's proposal would improve absolute funding for every division while widening the relative gap between the Championship and the divisions below it, because the organisation is asking for a larger pot as well as a different split and the larger pot does more work than the reweighting. Those figures appear to describe total indicative distributions rather than the incremental uplift alone, so the denominators should not be mixed, and they are reported terms rather than published league documents. The finding matters here because it bears on what redistribution actually changes: more money improves liquidity without necessarily improving profitability, if wage expenditure adjusts upward to meet it.
On 21 October the regulator's chair David Kogan characterised the IFR's powers in a Reuters interview. He said the regulator holds absolute authority to require a club's owners to sell, and drew a contrast with the Premier League on sanctions, saying the IFR cannot fine a club or deduct points. He added that the legislation does not permit the regulator to block a takeover purely because the purchaser is a state-backed fund, citing a Norwegian sovereign fund, and described agents' fees, which he put above £500m, as ridiculous.
Those are the chair's characterisations rather than a statement of the regulator's full statutory position, and the absence of a points-deduction power is not the absence of enforcement powers. What they establish is that the IFR's influence over clubs runs through licensing and ownership rather than sporting penalty — relevant as the distribution backstop under the Football Governance Act 2025 remains the mechanism standing behind the unresolved settlement.
Bordeaux: The Hearing Came and Went
We identified Bordeaux's Commercial Court hearing of 20 October as the next material test of Park Bench's acquisition. It did not conclude the restructuring.
A request for substantial modification of the continuation plan was filed on 9 October. Approximately 400 creditors vote on the modification between 26 October and 2 November, with the tribunal due to examine the plan and rule on approval on 3 November. The renegotiated debt is confirmed at approximately €13m, reduced from roughly €26m, repayable over twelve years to 2038.
The sequence matters more than the delay. A symbolic €1 acquisition transfers ownership; it does not discharge creditor obligations, and those creditors must now vote on terms extending their recovery across twelve years. Until the vote concludes and the court rules, a transaction agreed in September remains conditional on the consent of the parties repaid last.
United States: Exporting the Structures
The American dimension this month is the export of US private-market financing techniques into international football rather than any domestic transaction.
Avenue Capital is the frontrunner for Serie A's international rights. RedBird is in preliminary discussions over Al-Nassr while holding AC Milan, Toulouse and a minority position in Fenway Sports Group. The squad-value facilities reported in England draw on lending structures long established in American private credit.
Three different assets with different objectives do not establish that US managers are the marginal buyer of global football assets; that would require transaction-volume evidence not available here. What they show is the transfer of instruments. Minority stakes in rights vehicles, structured protections over cash flows and asset-backed credit are standard in US private markets and comparatively novel in European football, where ownership has meant equity control rather than structured exposure.
The consequence is that capital entering football is increasingly indifferent to whether it owns a club or holds a claim on a club's revenue. That is a different proposition from the owner-financier model the regulator has now measured, where capital arrives as equity and stays because withdrawing it would collapse the club.
Asia-Pacific: A Completed Transaction, Partly Disclosed
On 16 October, Central Coast Mariners announced that Holman Barnes Group had become a minority investor in the entity responsible for the club's A-League Men's and academy operations, and had separately executed a long-form agreement assuming operational responsibility for the A-League Women's team.
The two arrangements are not equivalent. A minority equity interest carries proportionate economic rights. Operational responsibility is a contractual arrangement whose economics depend on undisclosed terms. Consideration, ownership percentage and funding commitments were all withheld.
Holman Barnes Group has separately announced plans to convert the former Gosford Bowling Club into the Mariners Club, stating that proceeds from the venue will support the women's team. That links operating responsibility to an identifiable commercial funding source, which is more substantive than a general expectation of synergies, though the expected contribution and the allocation of operating losses are not disclosed.
The Commercial Divide
Research published this month by Football Benchmark and World Football Summit, reported by Reuters on 22 October, helps explain why investors pursue football assets despite the losses recorded elsewhere.
Across Europe's ten highest-earning clubs, commercial income rose in aggregate from 32% of operating revenue in 2008/09 to 49% in 2024/25, overtaking broadcasting. That is an aggregate finding and does not establish that commercial exceeds broadcasting at each of the ten individually. Those clubs increased combined revenue from €2,702m to €8,370m, a 3.1x rise. Across approximately 700 European top-division clubs, revenue grew from €11.6bn in 2008/09 to €28.6bn in 2023/24 and is estimated to have passed €30bn in 2024/25. The wider market took roughly a decade longer than the top ten to make the same crossover.
Three populations appear in this briefing and should not be read as one market: the ten highest-earning European clubs, the approximately 700 European top-division clubs, and the English regulated pyramid the IFR measures. Their reporting bases and financial years differ.
The lag is the finding that matters for allocation, and it rhymes with the regulator's own numbers. The largest clubs own international commercial platforms independent of any single broadcast contract. Smaller clubs remain exposed to league distributions, player trading, matchday income and owner financing — which is why the English Premier League-to-Championship multiple has moved from 2.7 to 8.7 across a comparable period.
Four Kinds of Capital
Category
Example
Economic character
Sustaining finance
Owner support measured by the IFR
Funds operating deficits or liquidity shortfalls
Ownership and restructuring capital
Al-Nassr, Al Hilal, Bordeaux, Mariners
Acquisition, recapitalisation or reorganisation
Commercial-rights monetisation
Serie A
Sells economic participation in future revenues
Secured credit
Squad-value facilities
Borrowing against assets or expected proceeds
FIFA sits outside these. A governing body distributing accumulated resources to its members is allocating capital it already holds, not raising it, selling participation in it or borrowing against it.
The distinction determines whether capital is repayable, whether ownership is diluted, who controls future cash flows and who bears downside risk.
Outlook
Base case.FIFA's programme proceeds to the December Council in modified form. Al-Nassr's discussions continue without a signed agreement this quarter. Serie A's clubs take the common-equity structure. Bordeaux's creditors approve the modified plan on 3 November.
Escalation.FIFA's reserves reconciliation attracts further challenge from the confederations that forced the first reversal. Al-Nassr's debt arrangements draw scrutiny over related-party sponsorship treatment. A Bordeaux creditor vote against the modification reopens liquidation risk.
De-escalation.FIFA secures Congress approval in March, closing the reserves dispute. Serie A completes at a valuation that sets a reference point for other leagues' international-rights vehicles.
What would change the view.FIFA's publication of a reserves bridge; any signed Al-Nassr agreement and its treatment of the sponsorship arrangements; the Serie A club vote; the Bordeaux ruling on 3 November; responses to the State of the Game consultation before it closes on 8 December; and the first disclosed terms of a squad-value facility.
Key Risks
FIFA's programme is a proposal. It requires Council approval in December and Congress approval in March 2027, and no reconciliation between reserves, cycle surplus and planned expenditure has been published.
Al-Nassr's discussions are preliminary. Stake, consideration, debt treatment and Ronaldo participation derive from reporting the principals decline to confirm.
Serie A requires 14 of 20 clubs. No bid has been accepted, and undisclosed contractual protections may matter more than headline valuations.
Squad-value facility terms are undisclosed. Collateral, covenants, pricing, maturity and recourse are not public, and no lending volume can be inferred.
The State of the Game report is a draft. Its findings are open for consultation until 8 December 2026 and may change before the final report, which is not a final regulatory determination until the IFR designates it as such.
New Deal terms are reported, not published. Neither league has published a term sheet, and the per-club figures in circulation appear to describe total indicative distributions rather than the incremental uplift.
Bordeaux remains conditional. The creditor vote and the 3 November ruling are both outstanding.
The Bottom Line
Football capital is becoming more differentiated rather than more abundant or more sustainable.
FIFA is redistributing accumulated resources, on a larger scale but a slower timetable than its members demanded, having abandoned the attempt to raise external capital against its competitions. Serie A is considering selling minority participation in international revenues it has not yet earned. Lenders are extending borrowing capacity against squad values that depend on realisations they do not control. Saudi Arabia is transferring state-controlled clubs into private ownership, one completed and one under discussion. Bordeaux's creditors are being asked to wait twelve years.
These structures allocate risk differently. Equity investors absorb residual performance. Secured lenders hold contractual claims whose value depends on uncertain realisations. Commercial-rights investors depend on future revenue, sometimes with priority over the clubs themselves. Governing bodies distribute according to institutional priorities rather than return requirements. None should be confused with recurring operating profitability.
The regulator's draft has now measured what sits beneath all of it in England: 94% of clubs loss-making, more than a quarter unable to last a month without their owners, and a Premier League club earning 8.7 times the average Championship club against 2.7 times a generation ago. The question is not whether more capital is entering football, but whether these structures improve cash generation, reduce dependence, or reallocate claims on income that has yet to materialise — and, where redistribution is the instrument, whether a larger transfer narrows the gap it is meant to address or widens it.
FAQ
What did the FIFA Council actually decide? It confirmed Forward Enterprise is permanently withdrawn and received a proposal for a $6.35bn development programme for 2027–2030. The programme is not approved and returns to the Council in December.
Is Al-Nassr sold? No. Discussions with a RedBird-led consortium are reported as preliminary, and no agreement has been announced.
Why is the lower Serie A bid preferred? It is structured as common equity, while competing bids seek protections over future cash flows that would rank ahead of the clubs if international revenues underperform.
Can lenders force clubs to sell players? Not on the reported structures. Security over sale proceeds is not a power to compel a sale.
Is the State of the Game report final? No. It is a draft published on 13 October 2026 for consultation, which closes on 8 December. A final report is expected in 2027.
Data and source note: FIFA figures are from the Council meeting of 15 October 2026; the Surplus Solidarity Programme is a proposal requiring Council approval in December 2026 and Congress approval in March 2027, and the 2023–2026 surplus forecast of $5.2bn–$5.6bn is unaudited. Prior distribution demands are as reported in correspondence covered in our 12 October briefing. Al-Nassr figures are from Semafor reporting of 19 October 2026 and are reported negotiating terms; riyal conversions are at approximately SAR3.75 to the US dollar. Al Hilal figures are as published in our 7 October briefing. Serie A figures are from Reuters reporting of 16 October 2026; implied valuations are calculated from approximate consideration and stake. Private-credit descriptions are from Financial Times reporting of 15 October 2026. IFR findings are from the draft State of the Game report, published 13 October 2026 and open for consultation until 8 December 2026; it is not a final regulatory determination. New Deal per-club figures are reported indicative distributions rather than published league terms and appear to describe total distributions rather than the incremental uplift alone. David Kogan's remarks are from a Reuters interview published 21 October 2026 and are his characterisation of the regulator's powers. Central Coast Mariners figures are from the club's announcement of 16 October 2026; financial terms were not disclosed. Football Benchmark and World Football Summit figures are from The Evolution of Club Revenues in European Football, reported by Reuters on 22 October 2026.
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